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Persians in Thucydides
Rosaria Vignolo Munson

Tbuq^dides’ representation of Persia is inextricably linked to his
response to Herodotus, who placed the Persians at the centre of his
work.‘ The younger historian was well aware that for the Greeks
of his time, as they were embarking on the long mutual war he
describes, the most vivid cultural memory concerned their earlier
resistance against the Persians, from which they derived a wealth of
still current paradigms. After Xerxes’ defeat, moreover, Persia con
tinued to exist as a neighbouring power, which mainland Greeks may
initially have viewed as marginal, but which ended up as the arbiter
in their own war. This chapter examines Thucydides’ representation
of Persia’s role in the history of the Greeks, what information about
Persian agents, culture, and events he knows about or considers
important, and his ‘Persian’ interactions with Herodotus.

1. THE PERSIAN WARS IN THUCYDIDES
Already in his first sentence, where he states that the Peloponnesian
War affected both the Greeks and parts of the non-Greek world, and
‘so to speak, most of mankind’ (1.1.2), Thucydides appears to signal
his awareness of the role that Persia will play after 412 bce.^ On
the other hand, here and in subsequent introductory chapters.
' On Thucydides’ knowledge of Herodotus, see esp. Hornblower (1992) and
(1996), 19-38.
^ 1.1.1; See Gomme (1945), 91; cf. 2.65.7.
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Thucydides is looking not forwards, but backwards as he emphasizes
the enormity of ‘his’ war in comparison to earlier ones. Persia was a
great power (1.16) and Xerxes’ invasion represented a time of danger
for Greece (1.18.1-2). But for the benefit of readers who in retrospect
might be inclined to consider the Persian attacks on Greece worthy
of the Great Historical Watershed Award of all times, Thucydides
minimizes it in quantitative terms that are hard to counter: it was a
short affair, after all, quickly resolved in two naval and two infantry
battles (1.23.1).
In a groundbreaking 1999 article, Tim Rood demonstrated
Thucydides’ awareness of the importance of the Greeks’ resistance to
Persia for their later history, and showed the influence of that conflict
(and of Herodotus’ account of it) on Thucydides’ shaping of his own
narrative. Rood’s analysis served as a healthy corrective to the
erroneous view that Thucydides has no interest in the Persian Wars
and is contemptuous of Herodotus. We should recognize, however,
that on this score Thucydides is sending somewhat of a double
message. If the Persian Wars represent an important subtext in
Thucydides’ narrative, he also signals, especially in the first five
books, that contemporary history has moved on.
In Thucydides, references to the Persian Wars occur mostly in
speeches as a means for gaining the diplomatic advantage in inter
national disputes just before or during the new Greek-on-Greek
conflict.^ Two overlapping themes predominate. One is the magnifi
cation or devaluation of the role of different cities during the Greek
resistance.^ The contrasting facts and interpretations put forth by
Thucydidean speakers emerge as strands recycled from the fabric
of Herodotus’ comprehensive narrative, but here they appear dis
membered and recontextualized, a fact that underlines the distinc
tion, which both Herodotus and Thucydides make in their own way,
between investigation and rhetorical attempts to capitalize on the
past.’ Such arguments, however, are not usually effective in con
temporary negotiations: most Thucydidean speakers who magnify
the Persian War and their role in it lose the debate. Several speakers
^ In the first seven books speakers mention the Persians only when speaking about
the Persian Wars. The (implicit) reference in Archidamus’ speech at 1.82.1 (see below,
p. 256) is an exception.
'* Athenians (1.73-75) vs. Sthenelaidas (1.86) and Corinthians (1.69); Plataeans
(3.54, 56-9) vs. Thebans (3.62-4); Euphemos at Camarina (6.83).
^ Cf. esp. Dewald (1999).

Persians in Thucydides

243

on both sides seem to recognize the irrelevance of the topic when
they more or less explicitly decline to rehash that event.*’
The second theme of Thucydidean discourses is to suggest
structural analogies between the Persian War past and current
circumstances.^ The Corinthians depict Athens as a polis turannos
that conquers, rather than liberates, the Greeks, and represent Athens
as unlike her former self and equivalent to Persia (1.68, 122.2-3,
123.3). Pro-Athenian speakers, by contrast, emphasize the continuity
between the bold Athenians who embarked on the ships and defeated
the Persians and their contemporary descendants, who ‘become
islanders’ to resist the Peloponnesian invasions, or can fight on many
fronts at the same time.®
The narrator in his own voice is more reluctant to make explicit
comparative references.® Aside from the dismissive evaluation at
1.23.1, we find only two more mentions of the Persian War in books
1-7. Thucydides’ statement that the Athenians in the imminence of
the first Peloponnesian invasion were aggrieved at having to leave
their farms ‘which they had just restored after the Median War’
(2.16) reformulates Pericles’ parallel with the evacuation of Attica at
the time of Xerxes (1.144) by focusing on the renewal and multiplica
tion of a painful experience.The second reference compares the
Spartan hoplites at Sphacteria, who ended up surrendering to
the enemy, to the Spartans at Thermopylae, who died defending
the pass (4.36.3)." This clear allusion to Herodotus, underlined by
an apology in Herodotus’ manner for comparing ‘small things
with great’," represents an early sign of Thucydides’ appreciation
of the moral dimension of the war that will emerge more clearly in
his account of the Sicilian Expedition. There the speakers’ explicit
references to Xerxes’ invasion (6.17.7, 33.5, 83) are integrated in a
narrative structure informed by intertextuality with Herodotus.
* Rood (1999), 145.
^ The comparison is embedded in the speeches cited in n. 4, except that of
the Plataeans. See also Mytileneans (3.10) and Hermocrates (6.33.5). Connor (1984),
93; and Rood (1999), 150.
* 1.143.5, 144.3-4, 6.17.7. Cf. Rood (1999), 147.
’ Cf., however, 1.98.4 and Felling (2000), 96.
“ Cf. Rood (1999), 149.
" Thucydides’ mention of ‘the path’ (4.36.3) echoes Hdt. 7.175.2 and 7.212.2.
Hornblower (1996), 32^ and 191. Thuc. 4.40.2 contrasts with Hdt. 7.226. See Foster,
Ch. 8 above.
Cf. Hdt. 2.10.1 and 4.99.5.
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The moralistic slant of each campaign story is the same, with hubris
punished in both cases.*^ Finally in book 8, the evocation of the past
is less tidy but, as we shall see below (§§VI-IX), the narrator will take
on a greater share of the discourse and draw attention to parallels
and reversals with respect to different moments of the Persian Wars.

II. THUCYDIDES AND THE NON-GREEK WORLD
In spite of the recent re-evaluation of the influence of Herodotus on
Thucydides, it cannot be denied that, with a partial but notable
exception (the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus, on which see
below), Thucydides does not focus on Persia per se, its extent, its
resources, its imperial structure, its people, or its king, not even in
the parts of book 1 (the Archaeology and Pentecontaetia) that would
have given him the occasion to do so. This stance vis-a-vis the
Persians agrees with Thucydides’ relative lack of interest in bar
barians in general,^'* and both are partly manifestations of what
scholars have described (with some truth, pace Rudd) as his
ideological rejection of Herodotus and of Herodotus’ way of doing
history.’^
Perhaps more importantly, Thucydides’ ignore-the-barbarian
brand of Hellenocentrism reflects the geopolitical situation of his
time and a post-Cimonian and Periclean focus on Athenian pre
dominance in Greece and the Aegean, which sees Thrace and the
coasts of Anatolia as the virtual eastern and northern borders of the
empire. In Thucydides’ synoptic view of different theatres,'® nonGreek peoples remain at the margins, more the object of the sideways
glances when Greeks have dealings with them than of a curious gaze.
Even his Sicilian insertion (6.1-6), though it represents a Herodotean
literary manoeuvre in many respects, is no ethnography in the
manner of Herodotus. Only rarely does Thucydides describe foreign
customs synchronically, just as also in the historical narrative the
nomoi and tropoi of foreigners do not usually appear among the most
” For the specific narrative parallels and differences, see esp. Rood (1999), 152-64;
Connor (1984), 175-6, 183, 197-202; and Cornford (1907), 88-220. See also the
different intertextual argument of Kallet (2001), 85-95.
Cf. his reductive attitude at 1,5-6. Gomme (1945), 10.
See Greenwood (2006), 7.
Ibid., 42-3.
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compelling motives or causes.'^ In his portrayal of barbarians,
nothing compares with his exploration of the ethos and ethnic
identity of Athenians, Spartans, Dorians, lonians, or other Greeks.’®
A partial exception is represented in Thucydides’ treatment of
Thrace, where he had family connections and property. The
Thracians are the subject of an ethnographically informative passage
(2.95-101) that includes a catalogue of tribes (2.96); measurements
of distances (‘at the fastest four days and four nights for a merchant
ship with the wind astern the whole way, while by land a man
travelling light by the shortest road, can get from Abdera to the
Danube in eleven days’, 2.97.1-2);^“ and the enumeration of the
tribute and gifts paid to the Odrysian king and nobles in gold and
silver, embroidered cloth and other objects (2.97.3). All this is worthy
of Herodotus’ Scythian and Thracian logoi or his catalogue of
the tributes of Persian satrapies (see esp. Hdt. 3.97), showing what
Thucydides can do when he has ‘been there’. This discussion of
tributes, however, leads to the report of a local Thracian custom that
shows Thucydides’ ideological distance from Herodotus’ perspective:
For they established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the Persian
kingdom, which also the other Thracians have, namely of taking rather
than giving (it is more shameful for them not to give when asked
than to ask and not receive), but anyway, they practised it as much as
possible. For it was impossible to get anything done without a present.
(2.97.4-5)

Thucydides here explains how Shakes’ empire has grown to the
point of inviting comparison with the Persian, thanks to an elaborate
tributary system. But with the inverted parallel he seems to pivot
from the topic of imperial revenues to that of bribes: the Odrysians are
takers, just as the Persians are notorious givers (especially to Greeks).^’
Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides is no objective ethnographer and
See Ostwald (1988); cf. Munson (2001b), 43-5.
As Connor rightly saw (1984: 36-47), the national characters of Athens and
Sparta in particular are for Thucydides an integral part of the causality of the war,
and Thucydides pursues the issue throughout his history. Cf e.g. 7.44, 58.
At 4.105 Thucydides says he had interests in the gold mines in the neigh
bourhood of Amphipolis and was influential with the natives in the area, where he
was also general in 424 bce. The name of Thucydides’ father, Olorus, is evidence of
Thracian descent. See Hornblower (1987), 1.
For Thucydides’ expression dvi)p eii^covos, see Herodotus 1.72.3, 1.104.1,
2.34.2. Hornblower (1991), 372.
See below, 1.109.2 (pp. 248-9); 8.83.3,45.
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rather speaks as a public executive and a business mogul (‘one can
get nothing done without gifts’). Similarly, his generalization about
the cowardice and ferocity of the Thracians in the account of
the Mycalessus massacre (7.29.4) expresses in blistering terms the
military man’s contempt for non-Greeks with whom he has dealt
directly.

III. PERSIANS IN THE PENTECONTAETIA
Aside from book 8, the greatest number of references to the Persians
of the period after the Persian Wars in the voice of the narrator occurs
in two analeptic narratives of book 1, the Pentecontaetia and the
excursus on Pausanias and Themistocles. The first passage is an
account of the growth of Athenian power from 479 to 434 bce. It is
preliminary to Thucydides’ narrative of the war and does not claim
to be detailed or complete.^^ Here the Persians are marginal: in spite
of the fact that these events are even further from Herodotus’ topic
than from Thucydides’, Herodotus’ scattered references provide
more information on Persian events between the two wars.
Thucydides informs us that the pretext for the foundation of
the Delian League was retaliation against the Persians.^^ In the
account that follows, Athenian dealings with Persian interests occupy
only about a third of the whole, with the balance mostly consisting of
military or diplomatic actions involving other Greeks. As a selective
sample of the character of the League’s activities in its early years,
Thucydides begins by listing aggressive operations in four places:
Eion, Scyros, Carystus, and Naxos (1.98.1-4). The last of these is
the occasion for Thucydides’ important reflection on Athenian
subjection of rebellious members of the League (1.99). The first, the
only one involving the Persians directly, is brutally brief: under
the leadership of Cimon the Athenians took Eion from the Medes
and enslaved its inhabitants.
A proleptic narrative of the same event appears in Herodotus’
account of Xerxes’ march through Thrace, where two Persian gover
nors will win the gratitude of the king for their gallant resistance at
Cf. Rood (1998), 225-48.
7Tp6axT]u<^< 1.96.1. Cf. Hornblower (1991), 144.
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the time of the Delian League operations Thucydides summarizes.
One of these men was the governor of Eion, Boges, who refused to
surrender under siege and immolated himself on a pyre with his
children, wives, concubines, and all the city’s gold and silver
(7.107.1-2). The contrast between Herodotus’ arresting description
and Thucydides’ account shows Herodotus, unlike Thucydides,
focusing on the non-Greek side, and seizing the opportunity (in the
midst of his account of Xerxes’ aggression!) to illustrate and translate
Persian notions of ayadia through the spectacular actions of specific
Persians. Also unlike Thucydides, Herodotus displays familiarity
with the Persian nobility and its ethical and political stance.^^ More
generally, Herodotus takes the conflict, contrast, possible analogies or
overlaps between the Eastern and the Western world-views as his
overarching theme.
From a historical or ‘current events’ perspective, this portion of
Thucydides’ work treats the Persians as old news. This markedly
differs from the attitude of Herodotus, who is sensitive to the
multi-levelled significance of the past he celebrates for the present of
narration and of the continuity between earlier and later events.^®
Moreover, Herodotus places the Persian and inter-Greek wars along a
continuum of imperialistic evils,^^ while Thucydides’ Pentecontaetia
as a whole arguably emphasizes the break between the two wars.
Already at the time of the capture of Sestos the Spartans have
withdrawn from the common effort (1.89.2); soon they will abandon
it for good (1.94-5). At Athens, although the alliance with Sparta is
still intact (1.92), the hero of Salamis is intent on outwitting the
Spartans, (1.90-3), and no longer the Persian king.^^ It is Thucydides’
opinion (ms i/jiot So/cet) that Themistocles drew his lesson on the
importance of defence by sea from the Persian War (see 1.93.7), but
his antagonism with the Peloponnesians was new. The narrator
appears to agree with this position.^* Soon after Themistocles dis
appeared from the political scene, in fact, the definitive dissolution

For Herodotus’ access to Persian sources, see Munson (2009). On Thucydides’
lack of familiarity with the Persians, cf. Westlake (1985), 43.
Cf esp. Fornara (1971), 57-84.
“ Cf 6.98; Stadter (1992); Munson (2001a), 201-5.
Cf Hdt. 8.75 and 8.110.2. See below, p. 254 and n. 60 for Thucydides’ reference
to variant versions of those Herodotean episodes.
See Thucydides’ praise of Themistocles’ foresight at 1.138.3 and his emphasis on
the impermanence of the Spartan-Athenian alliance at 1.18.3.
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of the alliance between Sparta and Athens (1.102-3) confirmed that
a new era had begun.
The Athenians, of course, continue to pursue a vigorous antiPersian policy, but the focus of Thucydides’ narrative is elsewhere.
Cimon’s double victory at the Eurymedon receives only a brief
mention (1.100). The Athenians’ massive and disastrous six-year
campaign to Egypt in support of the rebel Inaros (1.104 and 109-10)
seems to anticipate some of the themes of the Sicilian Expedition.^’
But Thucydides’ choice not to develop this section makes what must
have been a huge blow for Athens and a triumph for Persia appear
rather inconsequential in the longer term.^° It also minimizes the
themes of bad counsel and overreaching that are so prominent in
the Sicilian narrative, substituting an emphasis on the Athenians’
resilience and activism in the pursuit of empire, which is the major
theme of the Pentecontaetia.^‘ A few years later, in fact, Thucydides
places the Athenians in Cyprus with two hundred new ships and
again in Egypt (1.112.1-3).’^ How these anti-Persian operations
wind down remains unclear: of an end of the war with Persia he says
not a word.”
On Persian operations related to the Egyptian war, Thucydides
appears well informed. He reports the (presumably secret) royal
mission of a certain Megabazus, who tried to bribe the Spartans into
See esp. 1.110.1: ‘Only a few of many managed to escape to Gyrene marching
through Libya, but most died’ (oAi'yoi dno ttoXXojv Tropeudp-evm Sid Trjs
is
Kvp^vrjv iawdtjaav, oi Si TrAeiCTTOi dncoXovTo); 1.110.4: ‘[the Phoenicians]
destroyed most of the ships, and only a small number managed to escape’ {Sii<j>d€i,pav rds TToXXds twv v€Wv, at S’ iXdooovs Siitjivyov ndXLv)^ ‘this was the outcome
of the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt’ (rd p,iv Kara Trjv
pLeydXrjv arpaTeiav Mdrji'aioji' Kat r<jjv ^vpt.p.dywv is Atyvirrov ovtcos ireX^VTi)atv). Cf 7.87.6: ‘few out of many returned home; and these were the events in
Sicily’ (oAiyot d-no ttoXXuiv in oikov dnevoar-paav. ravra p,iv rd ntpl UiKeXiav
yevopLeva).
“ Cf. Hornblower (1991), 173-8, who also explains what losing the control of
Egypt would have meant for Persia. For a fuller account of the Athenian expedition to
Egypt (c.460-454), see Diodorus 11.71-5.
Thucydides seems to have considered (or reconsidered) the Sicilian expedition
in similar terms. The end of book 7 almost suggests the obliteration of all Athenian
hopes, but at 2.65.12 Thucydides coolly observes that the disaster did not prevent
Athens from pursuing the larger war for eight more years; likewise, the beginning of
book 8 emphasizes Athenian resilience.
For this campaign, see also Plut. dm. 18.5-9, and cf. Diod. 12.3-4, with Briant
(2002), 579.
” On the Peace of Callias and its aftermath, see esp. Diod. 12.4.4-5. Andrewes
(1961), 15-18; Kagan (1969), 107-13; Rood (1998), 229.
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invading Attica, and he mentions the general of the Persian army in
Egypt, Megabyzus son of Zopyrus (1.109.2-3).^^ In Herodotus,
Zopyrus recaptures Babylon during the reign of Darius; Herodotus
also mentions his son Megabyzus (confirming the role Thucydides
attributes to him in Egypt) as well as Megabyzus’ son Zopyrus
(Hdt. 3.160.2). This younger Zopyrus may well have been one of
Herodotus’ sources for matters of Persian history drawn from his
remarkable family tradition.” But since according to Herodotus he
defected to the Athenians, he may also have talked to Thucydides
about more recent events, including the strenuous Persian attempt
to regain control of Egypt under his father’s command.” If so,
Thucydides has not fully exploited that opportunity. He says nothing
about the initial revolt of Egypt from Persia, except that it was the
occasion for the Delian League’s intervention in support of Inaros.
Herodotus, by contrast, brings up this revolt three more times in
addition to the passage just cited (3.160.1). After saying that at the
site where Cambyses defeated Psammenitos in 525 he saw proof that
Persian skulls are soft and Egyptian skulls very hard, Herodotus adds
that he was able to verify this phenomenon ‘among the bodies of
the dead at Papremis, where Achaemenes, the son of Darius, was
defeated by Inaros of Libya’ (3.12.4).
Later in the Histories, Herodotus specifies that this Achaemenes
had become governor of Egypt after his brother Xerxes suppressed
a previous revolt and instituted a harsher regime, and that
Achaemenes subsequently died at the hands of the Libyan Inaros,
son of Psammenitos (7.7).^^ In spite of Inaros’ wrongdoings, says
Herodotus in a third passage (3.15.3-4), his son Thamyris eventually
obtained from the king the governorship of Egypt. From this and
other cases Herodotus infers that ‘the Persians are accustomed
(icodaoi) to honour the children of kings; even if they rebel from
them, nevertheless they at least give power back to their children’
Besides the Megabazus and Megabyzus in this passage, and the kings, Persian
individuals mentioned by Thucydides are Pissouthnes, Artabazus (son of Pharnaces I),
Pharnaces II (grandson of Pharnaces I and son of Pharnabazus I), Pharnabazus II
(son of Pharnaces II), Megabates, Artaphernes, Tissaphernes, Tamus, Arsaces, and
Cyrus the Younger. Cf Lewis (1977).
” See Wells (1907); Munson (2009), 464.
* See Ghimadayev (1983), cited by Hornblower (1991), 164.
” Cf. Thuc. 1.104.1 (‘Psammetichus’). For fuUer accounts of the Egyptian revolt
and Athenian expedition there, see Ctesias F 14.36-8 Lenfant, and Diodorus 11.71
and 74.
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(3.15.2). Herodotus is in the business of observing all sorts of dif
ferences among nations. Here his ethnographic impulse produces
insights about the interface between culture and policy in the area of
Persian relations with subject peoples. Throughout his work he holds
up Persian affairs for display as implicit terms of comparison for the
imperial challenges, especially revolts, of the type that Thucydides
describes in his history of the Athenian Empire.
Thucydides, for his part, pays attention to the Persians only insofar
as they potentially affect Greek interests. On the coast of Asia in
particular it was not uncommon for factions in the cities of
the Athenian League to seek help from the neighbouring satraps.^*
Thucydides omits most of these incidents, but the last Persian
passage in his Pentecontaetia records that at the time of the secession
of Samos, the Persian governor of Sardis, Pissouthnes son of
Hystaspes, supported the rebels. On that occasion the Athenians were
worried about the imminent arrival of the Phoenician fleet, which
however never materialized (1.115-16). More spectacular, though
equally inconclusive, had been earlier intrigues of Pausanias and
Themistocles with the Persians. The section where Thucydides tells
this story presents special features and deserves to be examined
separately.

IV. PAUSANIAS, THEMISTOCLES, AND THE PERSIANS
The Pausanias-Themistocles section is composed of two analeptic
passages inserted contiguously at the end of book 1 (1.128-34 and
1.135-8). At this point in the chronological development of the
main narrative, the outbreak of the new Greek-on-Greek conflict is
imminent. The Spartans have issued an ultimatum demanding that
the Athenians drive out the almost two-centuries-old Alcmaeonid
curse. The Athenians have responded by bidding the Spartans to
clean up some curses of their own (1.128.1-2). Since the Spartans
incurred one of these when they caused the death of Pausanias,
Thucydides takes the opportunity to tell the latter’s post-Persian War
e.g. probably in Erythrae (see ML 40), Sigeum (ATL III 55), Miletus (ATLII 57
60) and Caria (ATL III 114-17 and 308). For the last, see Kagan (1969), 179, also 98102; Briant (2002), 580.
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story (1.127-34), to which he attaches the post-Persian War story of
Themistocles at the point where the two stories appear to intersect
(1.135-8). This internal transition further distances the sequence
from its initial factual connection to the main narrative.
The insertion is an unexpected throwback to the past in more ways
than one. Its optional character and the manner in which it spins off
are in themselves typical of Herodotus. With both Athenians and
Spartans accusing each other of religious offences committed long
ago, Herodotus might have said that his logos required him to explain
the circumstances of those earlier events (see e.g. Hdt. 1.95.1). By
Thucydides’ usual standards, however, these grievances are not
genuine enough and therefore not causally important enough for
the outbreak of the war to merit explanation. Just as they are mere
diplomatic pretexts in the world of the narrated (1.126.1), so they
also constitute a blatant pretext for the analepses from the point
of view of Thucydides’ discourse. Thucydides has already treated
Themistocles and Pausanias (in this order) in the Pentecontaetia.^^
His choice to add more at this point or, to put it another way, to sever
this material from its proper chronological context, provides a clue
that the excursus has a paradigmatic and thematic role. The excursus
represents a reflection on general issues that will be important in the
rest of the work, such as the nature of leadership in connection to
the Spartan and the Athenian character. It therefore prepares the
reader for the entrance of Pericles, Thucydides’ protagonist and the
ultimate leader in the war that is about to begin.^°
These insights explain the anomalous position of the section, but
not so much its oddity in form and contents. The PausaniasThemistocles excursus appears to replace what we have called
Thucydides’ overall rejection of Herodotus (see above, p. 244) with
an imitation of Herodotus, adopting this author’s favorite structure,
diction, historical method, and focus. It includes aspects of what we
would expect Thucydides to regard as legendary (a partial sense of to
” 1.89.3-95.7; see above, §III. For the ‘Herodotean’ flavour of Thucydides’
narrative about Themistocles and the walls at 1.89.3-93.7, see Blosel, above,
pp. 216-18.
“ Most concise on this point is Finley (1942), 139. On ‘Pausanias-Themistocles’
from a literary viewpoint, see also esp. Cornford (1907), 135-7; Konishi (1970);
Westlake (1977); Connor (1984), 48-9; Carawan (1989); Hornblower (1987), 26
and (1991), 211-12; Patterson (1993); Rood (1998), 138 and 180. There is also a
substantial bibliography on the difficulties of this passage from the point of view of
the historical Pausanias or Themistocles or both; see e.g. Lang (1967).
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fxvdd)Ses at 1.22.4): a biographical interest of Eastern stamp,the

introduction of probably fictional letters,attention to personal
motives, and the appearance of a female character in an active
role.^^ Here we also find the subdivision of the narrative through
summarizing introductions and conclusions,^^ a leisurely narrative
pace and simple style,^^ the Herodotean use of certain words,^*
metanarrative references to research, hearsay, or tradition,^^ the
presence of poetic or exotic-sounding expressions,^® celebration
through superlatives,"*® and the description of enduring memorials.®”
Many of these features individually occur elsewhere in Thucydides.
But the sheer accumulation of them in a single narrative at the end
of book 1, when we have already grown accustomed to a certain
Thucydidean style, is designed to throw the reader off balance.
The way in which the excursus deals with Persia is also
Herodotean and contradicts what we have noticed so far about
Thucydides’ criteria of selection. In the first place, it highlights
Persian customs and institutions in an uncharacteristic way. The
term aarpaiTeLa, which Herodotus defines as a province of the
"" Cf. Momigliano (1993), 34-8.
Pausanias to Xerxes (1.128.7), Xerxes to Pausanias (1.129.3), and Themistocles
to Xerxes (137.4), the first two introduced with the prospective rdSe (instead of
TotavTa) in the Herodotean manner. Cf. in Herodotus the letters of Harpagus to
Cyrus (1.124), Amasis to Polycrates (3.40). Cf Westlake (1977), 102-3. For a detailed
re-examination of the Themistocles excursus, see now Blosel, Ch. 9 above, pp. 223-36.
Admetus’s wife at 1.136.3; cf in Hdt. Mitradates’s wife (1.111), etc. For Gomme
(1945), 438 the supplication episode resonates of tragedy, while for Carawan (1989),
154 the scene recalls Odysseus’ supplication of Arete (Od. 7.133-81). Herodotean
storytelling frequently combines epic and dramatic elements.
■‘‘‘ For prospective introductions, see e.g. iyevero Si ToidvSe at 1.128.3, and see
further 128.4,128.6,129.3. For retrospective conclusions, see 1.129.1 {roaavTa fj,iv rj
ypatf>rj iSrjXov) as well as the solemn close of the entire double narrative at 1.138.6.
‘Here the lion smiled’, says the scholiast with relief
** e.g. STTapriarai as synonym for AaKeSatpioviot at 1.128.3, 131.1, 132.1 (as
frequently in Hdt.). The expression rdr TSXX-qviKov TToXefjLOv apparently to mean ‘the
war of the Greeks (against Persia)’ at 1.128.3 is not found in 5th-cent. authors; see
also ivSvop^evos (1.130.1). Cf Westlake (1977), 97-102.
" See below, p. 255.
Sopl iX(l)v, ‘having captured them by the spear’ (1.128.7); ae
vv^ p.rj6’
rjjxipa i-rrtax^TU) ojare dvflvai npdaaeiv ti (Lv ip.ol imiaxvrj, ‘let neither night nor
day keep you from doing what you promise me’ (1.129.3).
1.138.3: ^e^awTara . . . Kpariaros .. . dptaros', 1.138.6: Aa/UTTpordrou?
ytvop,ivovs r&v Kad’avrovs 'EXX^pvaiv.
1.134.4 (the burial of Pausanias and subsequent Spartan dedications); 132.2-3
(Pausanias’ inscribed tripod at Delphi); 138.5-6 (monument to Themistocles in the
agora of Magnesia and secret burial in Attica).
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Persian Empire, appears only here in Thucydides (1.129.1).®‘ Persian
evepyeala—in the sense of‘benefactions’ to the king—is a feature of
Achaemenid internal policy emphasized by Herodotus.^^ The expres
sion dv'pp TTioTos (1.128.7) to denote the king’s faithful, also appears
in Herodotus in an Achaemenid context, as does dvpp dyados, as we
have already seen.” Direct communications between Greek indi
viduals and the king are frequent in Herodotus, but occur only here
in Thucydides. The narrative trope of noting that ‘the king rejoiced’
after reading Pausanias’ letter {3ep^r]s 8e tjoOt] ■ ■ ■ rfj iTnaToXfj,
1.129.1) recalls several passages in Herodous where an eastern
monarch is pleased (or not) with his adviser.” It is paralleled by the
king’s reaction to the letter of Themistocles (1.138.1, ^aaiXevs ■ ■.
idavp,aae), whom Thucydides himself praises as d^ios Oavp-doai
at 1.138.3.^^ Artaxerxes rewards Themistocles with the gift of three
cities in Asia (1.138.5); to Pausanias Xerxes offers unlimited
resources in gold, silver, and military forces (1.129.3). Thucydides
has a lot to say elsewhere on the subject of Persians and money
(especially in book 8), but the insistence on visible symbols of
Eastern wealth (gold and silver, et sim.)-, only paralleled by
Thucydides’ description of the Odrysian Empire, is another
Herodotean trait.”
1.129.1. Hdt. translates aaTpaneia at 1.192.2 and 3.89.1. The term aarpaTnjs
does not occur until Xenophon; Herodotus and Thucydides use imapxwv (rather
loosely) or dpx'v*' for the Persian governor of a province. Cf. Munson (2005), 56.
“ See 1.128.4, eiiepyeaiav ... is /SaaiAea; 1.129.3, Ktiatrai ooi eiiepyeaia iv tw
r/puripw oiKcp is
dvaypavros, where dvaypa-mos refers to the special list on
which the king’s benefactors were inscribed (cf. euepyerijs jSaoiAeos dviypa(firj in
Herodotus 8.85.3); 1.137.4, puoi eiiepyeaia o^eiAerai. Herodotus gives the Persian
term orosangai for the tvepyirai, or benefactors of the king of Persia (8.85.3), and
throughout his work mentions several individuals who earned this position. Cf.
Munson (2005), 57. The term evepyirris is of course also used for expectation of
Greek-on-Greek reciprocity, an important theme in Herodotus as well as in this
Thucydidean passage: see 1.136.1, where Themistocles is called evepyir-qs of the
Corcyraeans (1.136.1).
Cf. also Xerxes’ injunction to Pausanias Trpdaaeiv ws dptara Kat maroTaTa
(1.129.2). TTioTOTaTOs is also used of Argilius at 1.132.5. For ttlotos in Herodotus in
a Medo-Persian context, see e.g. 1.108.3, 113.3, 3.74.1; dvrjp dyados occurs, for
example, in the description of Boges, the governor of Eion at 7.107.1 cited above,
p. 247.
*■* Cf. Gomme (1945), 432. See e.g. 8.69.2 (Xerxes vs. Artemisia).
“ Herodotus typically expresses ‘wonder’ and attributes it to his characters; see
e.g. 7.204 and 208.3.
For the Odrysian Empire at 2.97, see above, pp. 245-6. Cf. also 2.13 for
Athenian gold.
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Writing like Herodotus, Thucydides completes and corrects two
biographies his predecessor had purposely left unfinished.^^ He
vividly fleshes out Herodotus’ references to Pausanias’ hubris and his
desire to be the ruler of Greece.^* He manipulates the pattern of
the individual Greek who tries to find favour with the king of Persia,
so that Pausanias acquires certain stereotypical features of the
Herodotean Themistocles.” Themistocles’ letter to Artaxerxes in
Thucydides reproduces and internally confirms that Themistocles
had sent messages to Xerxes, as reported by Herodotus. Thucydides’
account of Themistocles’ flight to Persia shows the fulfilment of
Herodotus’ proleptic reference to the same outcome.® Pausanias’
offer to marry Xerxes’ daughter (1.128.7) smacks of a tall tale
competing with the more restrained tradition in Herodotus that
Pausanias, ‘if the story is true’, became engaged to the daughter of
Megabates, a cousin of Darius who was general in west Asia before
the Ionian Revolt.*' The issue of cultural differences, fundamental in
Herodotus, but normally ignored by Thucydides, is also conspicuous
in this passage. Thucydides’ Pausanias, like the Herodotean Scyles
(4.78), transgresses his national space and norms in diet, dress, and

” Patterson (1993), 146 is largely on target here, and see also Hornblower (1991),
211. Herodotus’ treatment of Pausanias and Themistocles, however, is itself ironical,
in the sense that it counts on his audience’s awareness of the unfortunate end of both
leaders. See Fornara (1971), 62-74.
Thuc. 1.128. 3 e(f>i.€ix€vos rrjs EAAr/vi/rijj apxrjs ‘aiming at the rule of Greece’
corresponds to Hdt. 5.32 epcora ax<jjy TrjS EAAdSoj Tvpavvos yeveadai; cf.
Thucydides’ statement at 1.95.3 that his position seemed to the Greeks an imitation
or tyranny more than a generalship. At 1.130.2 Thucydides expands Herodotus’
reference to the ii^pis of Pausanias (Hdt. 8.3.2) with a description of his violent ways.
He becomes ‘difficult to approach’ (Sva-iTpoaoSov . . . dfroiaiy djOTc p,TjS€va
Svvaadai TTpoaUvai, 130.2), recalling both the royal inaccessibility of Deioces
(Hdt. 1.96) and the tyrannical rages of Cambyses (Hdt. 3.27-36) and Cleomenes
(Hdt. 6.75.1).
See the intermediary Gongylus at 1.128.6 corresponding to Sicynnus in
Herodotus 8.75 and 8.110.2. The vavKX-qpos in Thucydides 1.137.2-3 fulfils a similar
function. For the pattern of the Greek exile in Persia, cf. Boedeker (1987), 191-3.
“ See Thuc. 1.137.4, referring to the messages reported by Herodotus 8.75 (before
Salamis) and 8.109 (after Salamis, with the proleptic reference to Themistocles ’ flight
to Persia at 110.5).
Hdt. 5.32.1. This is probably the Megabates of Thuc. 1.129.1, governor of
Dascyleion until Xerxes replaced him with Artabazus son of Pharnaces in response
to Pausanias’ appeal. The name of Pharnaces appears as Parnaka of the Persepolis
fortification tablets. Another of his sons, Pharnabazus, is the father of Pharnaces II,
the destinatary of the Spartan embassy at Thuc. 2.67 and the father of the famous
Pharnabazus of book 8. Cf. Lewis (1977), 7-11,52; Hornblower (1991), 215.
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demeanour (1.130.1).*^ As a fugitive from his land, Themistocles
adopts foreign ways, although he remains productive and sane: ‘he
learned as much as he could of the Persian language and of the
customs of the country’ (1.138.1).
In the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus, metanarrative references
justify the origin of some of the information (d»? varepov aviqvpddr],
1.128.6), or caution the reader that certain parts of the story are the
product of hearsay (cu? Aeyerat, 1.132.5 and 138.1; Xeyerai, 1.134.1;
(f>aai, 1.138.6); on one occasion, the narrator proposes an alternate
version (Aeyouai 5e rivej, 1.138.4). All this conforms to Herodotus’
practice of Aeyetv rd Aeyd/xeva, and not to Thucydides’ model of
processing his research in advance and out of view.
Because the whole Pausanias-Themistocles section is pervaded by
‘an aura of Ionian laropir]’, to use the words of one scholar, many
think that Thucydides composed it early in his career.^^ What is more
important and certain, at any rate, is that it was rather late in his
career that Thucydides chose to include it at this point of his work.
Regardless of its origins, the piece functions in its present context as
a ventriloquist display of a type of historiography Thucydides
had rejected by the time he settled on his own special method and
project.*^ It is tempting to regard it as Thucydides’ farewell to
Herodotus, and to the topics, method, and style Herodotus stood for.
At a close range, that is, the alienation from Greece of the two most
distinguished Persian War heroes (see Xaprrpordrovs at 1.138.6)
signals the irrelevance of that past: in Pausanias, Thucydides sees the
corruption of the old Panhellenic ideal and in Themistocles the albeit
premature foresight to move away from it. Thucydides’ praise of
Themistocles (1.138.3)—somewhat closer to his usual style—forms a
‘natural bridge’ to the entrance of Pericles, who in the ‘now’ of the
main narrative inherits Themistocles’ role.*"^
® The language of nomos is prominent here: ev tw KadearuiTi rpoirw (1.130.1),
i^eSiBifirrjTo tcjv KadiOTWTwv vop.ip.coi' (1.132.2), (p^pco/revoi ro) rpoTTw wTiep
€lcL>daaiv is afds avrovs) (1.132.5).
“ Westlake (1977), 96, arguing for the existence of a written source (Charon of
Lampsacus); see also Carawan (1989) (Stesimbrotus of Thasos). These theories are
speculative, but they remind us that Herodotus need not have been the only model.
^ I suggest as a parallel the beginning of the Histories (1.1-5), where Herodotus
makes a few important points even while he gives a demonstration of what he does
not intend to do in his work.
® Hornblower (1991), 223, who especially notices the parallelism between
KpariOTOS avToaxeSid[,eiv rd Siovra, of Themistocles at 1.138.3 and ovBevos
ijaacov . . . yvcbrai t€ rd Siovra Kai ipfxevevaai, ravra of Pericles at 2.60.5.
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For the long range, however, the past will be far from irrelevant. In
fact, the paradigm of Pausanias and Themistocles was perhaps
prophetic, and destined to reappear again, together with Persia, in
the figures of the Athenian Alcibiades and Tissaphernes at the end of
the work as we have it, and in the figures of the Spartan Lysander and
Cyrus in the projected ending Thucydides never wrote. But in that
later part of the History, from what we are able to see, Thucydides’
recognition of Herodotus takes a very different form.

V. PERSIA IN THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
The machinations of Pausanias and Themistocles, Megabazus’
embassy to Sparta (1.109.2), and Pissuthnes’ support of the revolt
of Samos (1.115-16) already suggest the circumstances of future
Persian interference in Greece. Greek leaders might have their own
reasons to cut deals with Persian officials. The latter have abundant
resources and might be willing to spend them to promote their inter
ests as they chafe at the Athenians’ presence on the Asiatic coast. This
pattern will come to the foreground in Thucydides’ book 8. Here we
will look at earlier phases of this involvement.
Starting from very beginning of the war, according to Thucydides,
both Peloponnesians and Athenians planned diplomatic missions
to elicit the king’s assistance (2.7.1). The Spartans in particular
formulate their policy early on, when Archidamus defensively asserts
that, faced with the danger of Athens, the Spartans are justified in
attempting ‘to acquire allies both Greeks and barbarians’ (1.82.1).**
In the second year of the war, we learn of a Peloponnesian embassy
dispatched to Persia in order to ask for funds.*^ While on their way
to Asia the envoys visit the Thracian king Shakes, where, however,
they are betrayed to some Athenian ambassadors present at Shakes’
court. The Spartans are brought to Athens and summarily put to
death (2.67.2-4). Thucydides’ narrative emphasizes this Athenian
violation of international convention, which shows the fragility of

“ Meaning Persians as well as Thracians (see 2.67).
On Spartan contacts with Persia, cf. Lewis (1977), 61-4, and Brunt (1965),
262-4.
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human and divine laws under the pressure of war.®® But a secondary
theme is the pathetic fate of the Peloponnesian envoys, who, in
contrast to their heroic ancestors celebrated by Herodotus, neither
reach their destination nor return home.®®
A missed opportunity to exploit Persian interests in Asia occurs
three years later, when the Spartans sail across the Aegean with the
intent of aiding the Mytilenean revolt. They are late for that mission,
but at Erythrae some lonians and Lesbians urge them to capture a
base and foment a revolt of Ionia, suggesting that Pissouthnes (the
governor of Sardis who had supported the Samian rebels) might be
persuaded to lend his support. But the plan seems too dangerous to
the Spartan admiral Alcidas, who decides instead to return home
(3.31).
The third and last Archidamian War episode of Persian involve
ment belongs to the seventh year (winter of 425/4), when an
Athenian commander in Thrace intercepts Artaphernes, a Persian
envoy on his way to Sparta.^” In Athens they translate the message
he is carrying: the king, it said, did not understand what the
Lacedaemonians wanted; many ambassadors had come, but they all
said something different; if they wished to speak clearly, they should
send him other envoys with this Persian (4.50.2). What the Spartans
wanted, of course, was Persian money, and they must have been
aware that the king expected territorial promises in exchange. But
they have been calling themselves the ‘liberators of Hellas’ and
cannot unambiguously offer to barter with Persia the freedom of
the Asiatic Greek states, hence the enduring communication gap.^^
The irony is palpable, because traditionally it is the Spartans who
are likely to exhibit befuddlement at the diplomatic contortions of
foreign envoys that come to them.^^ Here the Persian king com
plains—in Assyrian—that the plain-speaking Spartans have not been
expressing themselves all that plainly to him.
This passage wraps up Thucydides’ view of the role of Persia in
the Archidamian War and explains the meaning of his selective
“ This episode, which must have shocked contemporaries, also appears in Hdt.
7.137.2-3; see Munson (2001a), 191-3.
® On the 480 bce mission to Persia of Sperthias and Boulis, the fathers of the two
Spartan envoys of 430, see Hdt. 7.133-7.
™ Possibly an Achaemenid, perhaps a relation of the two Artaphernes, father and
son, in Hdt. 5.25.1, 6.42.2, 7.74.2. Cf. Lewis (1977), 2.
” 2.8.4. Cf. Gomme (1956), 499.
” See Hdt. 3.46; cf. 1.152 and Thuc. 1.86.1.
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treatment of Persia’s negotiation with the Greeks. A scene in Aristo
phanes’ Acharnians suggests that the Athenians had had dealings of
their own with Persia and that by these negotiations—ineffective
enough to become comic material—Athens, like Sparta, hoped to
obtain financial support.^^ Thucydides records no specific cases of
Athenian embassies, except for the Athenian envoys in charge of
escorting Artaphernes back to Asia at 4.50.2. These men intend
to seek an audience with the king, presumably to counter Spartan
diplomacy, but return home after learning of Artaxerxes’ death
(spring 424).^^ There is some evidence that the Athenians sent
another mission in the following year.^^ Thus, while probably under
reporting Athenian contacts with Persia in the Archidamian War,
Thucydides chooses to single out for attention three incidents
involving the Spartans, all ending in failure and pointing to Spartan
inadequacy abroad. The Spartans have no coherent international
policy likely to motivate the king, they lack the drive to campaign
overseas, and they are utterly unable to persuade, communicate,
negotiate—or even competently move—on the borders of the Greek
world. Persia, as a result, remains on the sidelines of the action until a
weakened Athens and a Sparta that lets go of her scruples will turn
her into a major player in the Greek war.

VI. ENTER PERSIA
The Artaphernes narrative at 4.50 marks the point at which
Thucydides almost entirely stops looking in the direction of Persia as
he reports the last years of the Archidamian War and the Peace of
Nicias. With his description of the Sicilian Expedition, he is making a
different movie, one more than ever informed by the memory of the
Persian Wars but oblivious of contemporary Persia.’^^ The Persian
gap lasts from 4.50 to 8.5.4 and covers a span of ten years, aside from
” The Acharnians (425 bce) was produced about one year before Artaphernes of
Thuc. 4.50 was brought to Athens. Cf Knights 478, where the Paphlagonian/Cleon
accuses his enemies of intrigues with Persia. Cf Gomme (1956), 499.
For problems of the chronology, see Lewis (1977), 69-76, and Hornblower
(1996), 207-8.
See Andocides 3.29 and ML 70. Cf Andrewes (1961), 2—4; Kagan (1974), 306;
Lewis (1977), 76-7.
See above, pp. 243-4.
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a brief report at 5.1 that the Delians, whom the Athenians, citing
religious concerns, had expelled from Delos, were allowed to settle in
Atramyttion by Pharnaces, the governor of Dascyleion.’'^ This notice
serves as a ‘seed’ for a later episode that illustrates one of the themes
in book 8, the victimization by both Persians and Greeks of the
Greeks living on the Asiatic coast.^*
In book 8, after her defeat in Sicily, Athens engineers her own
recovery and mounts a new force, while in the Eastern Aegean two
new parties become ready to take advantage of her weakness with
Peloponnesian help: while the lonians see the opportunity to acquire
freedom from Athens, the Persians are eager to resubject the lonians
to their rule. These complementary goals bring together the two
Persian strands that emerged separately in the earlier part of
Thucydides’ work, namely the representation of the real Persia ‘now’
and the memory of the Persian War past, beginning from the Ionian
Revolt of 499.
Thucydides stages the appearance of Persia in his narrative for
maximum impact. In contrast with previous (unsuccessful) Spartan
missions to Persia (see above, §V), he now reports consecutively two
different Persian initiatives to contact the Greeks. First, Chians and
Erythraeans arrive in Sparta, taking with them an ambassador from
Tissaphernes who invites the Peloponnesians to Asia and promises
financial support (rpo^ryv, 8.5.4-5). At about the same time,
Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnaces, Tissaphernes’ colleague to the
north, sends to Sparta certain Greek exiles living at his court, with
the request to bring Peloponnesian ships to the Hellespont. Both
satraps hope to obtain a Spartan alliance for the king, in order to
induce the cities in their respective provinces to revolt from the
Athenians, and thereby regain their tribute (8.6.1).
While Pharnabazus is from a lineage of satraps of Dascyleion
familiar to Thucydides’ readers,^^ Tissaphernes, introduced with
no patronymic, comes out of the blue.®” The appearance of the
Persian factor in book 8 is indeed all the more sudden because of

” On the gap, see Andrewes (1961).
™ The fate of the Delians of Atramyttion is reported 8.108.4; see below p. 274.
” Above, n. 61.
He appears here for the first time with no patronymic or introduction. Cf.
Westlake (1985), 43. For the possibility that Tissaphernes draws his lineage from one
of Herodotus’ Hydarnes, see Lewis (1977), 83-4; Hornblower (2008), 765.
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Thuq^dides’ choice not to update us on relevant Persian develop
ments that have taken place since the death of Artaxerxes (which
he mentioned at 4.50.2), including the revolt of Pissouthnes, the
anti-Athenian satrap of Thucydides’ earlier accounts.®^ Pissouthnes
was defeated and replaced by Tissaphernes, who in fact appears now
at 8.5.4 as Darius’ ‘general of the districts on the coast’ {aTpaT-qyds
... ru)v KaTCd)}^ Thucydides has also given us no advance notice of
a probably connected situation, the still ongoing rebellion in Caria of
the son of Pissouthnes, Amorges, whom we find fighting on the
Athenian side later on.®^ We first hear of the revolt of Amorges in the
narrative of the Chian embassy to Sparta, and only indirectly,
through Thucydides’ report of Tissaphernes’ thought. This is not a
trivial event, because in addition to his eagerness to recover the
tribute from the Greek cities in his province Tissaphernes’ desire to
capture or kill Amorges is apparently one of the causes for his desire
to join the Peloponnesian side in the war (8.5.5).
The paraphrase of the address of Tissaphernes’ ambassador to the
Spartan assembly iivqyeTo ... v-mayy^lTo) and of his intentions
(evdjLu^e), which in turn includes references to the king as a constant
but distant point of reference {vtto ^acriAeoi? . .. jSaaiAef. .. cocrTrep
avrw TTpoaeVa^e ^aaiXevs), recalls the calculations Herodotus
attributes to Aristagoras on the eve of the Ionian Revolt (Hdt.
5.35.1). Persian focalization has been rare since Thucydides’ report
of Megabazus’ mission, the royal letters in the PausaniasThemistocles piece, and the letter confiscated from Artaphernes.®^
The paraphrase is novel because of Thucydides’ representation of a
Persian agent whose strategy and motives will become the object of
scrutiny in an unprecedented way.
But the ‘Persia’ that plays such an important role in Thucydides’
narrative of the Greek War from this point on is not the grand
empire Herodotus describes, the multicultural home of distant
*' See 1.115 and 3.32.1. On the revolt of Pissouthnes, see Ctesias (F 15.53 Lenfant).
For a discussion about whether Tissaphernes was the territorial satrap of Sardis
or held a special western command, see Flornblower (2008), 767-8. Cf. Hyland
(2007), 3 and n. 9.
8.5.5; at 8.19.2 both Athenian and Amorges’ forces threaten the Peloponnesians
at the same time, but only from 8.28.2 and 8.54.3 do we learn that the Athenians
are backing him. Cf. Andocides 3.29. The chronology is uncertain; see Andrewes
(1961), 4-6; Rood (1998), 153-4; Hornblower (2008), 765 and 769-70, with recent
bibliography.
Cf. 1.109.2; 4.50.2.
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capitals, possessing a global policy masterminded by the king. It is
rather the peripheral space of its most western provinces, where the
king is present only as a removed authority (or potential constraint)
in documents and diplomatic discourse.®^ Similarly, in an earlier
passage that testifies to Thucydides’ awareness of Persia’s role in
Athens’ ultimate defeat, he speaks neither of Persia, nor of the king as
its central executive, but in a more limited way of ‘the king’s son
Cyrus, who provided funds to the Peloponnesian fleet’ (2.65.12).
The two satraps of book 8, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, have no
special cultural trait or perspective. They rather resemble the many
scheming Greek individuals with sectarian interests and limited
control who proliferate in this part of the narrative. Money—hard
cash—becomes a crucial issue. Thucydides does not mention Persian
dinners or piles of silver and gold, like Herodotus, or like Thucydides
himself in the Pausanias-Themistocles episode and in his description
of Odrysian wealth.®® The colourful utterance that Alcibiades will
attribute to Tissaphernes—that he will not leave the Athenians with
out pay, ‘not even if he had to turn his own bed into silver coin’
(8.81.3)—is a deliberately phoney piece of verbal perserie by a most
unreliable speaker.®^ For the narrator Thucydides, the Persian satraps
are simply pragmatic executives, careful with their investments (the
rpo(f>r] they are ready to pay to the Peloponnesian fleet) and eager to
recuperate the revenues (^dpot) from the cities in their provinces.

VII. WHAT THE SPARTANS WANT
The narrative that follows the account of the embassies at 8.5-6
raises the problem of the position of the Spartans, who have begun
the war as liberators of Greece from Athens (2.8.4), but now become
the instruments of the resubjection of Ionia to Persia. The Spartans
accept the invitation of the Chians and Tissaphernes (8.6.2),
“ See 8.17.4, 8.28.3, 8.37.2 and 4; 8.43.3, 8.46.1, 8.52, 8.56.4, 8.58.2, 8.84.5, 8.87.5.
In Thucydides, the only direct contacts between Greeks and the Persian king occur in
the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus of book 1: see above, p. 253.
“ For Persian symbolic wealth in the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus, see 1.129.3
and above, p. 253; Odrysian wealth: 2.97.3 and p. 245.
I am borrowing the term perserie from Miller (1997). Alcibiades is talking to
Athenians who have their own preconceived ideas of how a Persian satrap would talk.
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although the prospect of cooperation with Pharnabazus in the
Hellespont remains on the table and will be revived periodically.**
The evocation of Herodotus’ Ionian Revolt—by means of implicit
analogies and inversions, and with different individuals sharing this
or that role—becomes compelling when the Peloponnesians, led by
Chalcideus and Alcibiades (who is the new Aristagoras at this point),
bring about the revolt of Miletus while the Athenian fleet takes its
station at Lade (8.17.3). Lade is the site of the notorious Ionian
defeat in 499,*® and to make sure we do not miss the coincidence,
Thucydides follows it up with an abrupt prospective announcement
of the ‘first alliance’ between the Spartans and the Persian king
(8.17.4).
The way in which Thucydides marks this treaty recalls the
sentence with which, after the battle of Lade and the destruction of
Miletus, Herodotus underlines the third subjection of Ionia (Hdt.
6.32). This third subjection follows a first and a second subjection by
Lydians and Persians, respectively, and just as Herodotus implicitly
looks forward to a fourth enslavement of Ionia (the one by Athens,
after the Persian Wars), so Thucydides anticipates the second and
third treaties between Sparta and Persia (8.36 and 8.57.2), all of
which bring about the equivalent of a fifth enslavement, by delivering
the lonians once again into Persian hands.®” These agreements
confirm the history of Ionian vulnerability, which begins with
Herodotus’ account of the Mermnad aggressions (Hdt.l.14-26) and
culminates at the end of Herodotus’ work with the debate between
the Spartans and Athenians about what to do with the lonians after
the Persian Wars, at which time the Spartans propose to move them
to Greece or else let them fend for themselves (Hdt. 9.106.2-4). In
Thucydides, that history continues with the lonians’ subjection by
Athens and with the ambiguous policy of the Spartans in the
Archidamian War, by which the ‘liberators of Hellas’ send embassies
“ S.6.2-5, 8.8.2,8.39.1,8.61.1 and 62.1, 8.80.1, 8.99.1.
For echoes of the Ionian Revolt see Kallet (2001), 95-7 and Hornblower (2008),
800-1.
The term ‘enslavement’ borrows from Herodotus’ language at 6.32, and is
echoed by Thucydides in the indirect speech of Lichas at 8.43.3 (see below, p. 263).
See Hornblower (2008), 801. For Herodotus on the conquests of Ionia, see Munson
(2007), 146-9. Thucydides also echoes Herodotus’ narrative of the defeat at Lade in
his sombre reflection on the reversal of fortune of Chios (8.24), which corresponds to
Herodotus’ lament on Chian sufferings after Lade (Hdt. 6.26-7); see also below,
p. 274.
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to the Persian king, who therefore (of course) is confused about what
they could possibly want (above, §V). Now, during the Ionian phase
of the war, the Spartans appear ready to acknowledge in writing that
they want to win the war, whatever the cost.
The material support Tissaphernes has promised to the Spartans
will consist of payment for the Peloponnesian crews (8.5.5), although
the first treaty says nothing on this topic (8.18). The two allies
cooperate in the war and the Peloponnesians capture lasus and
Amorges (8.28.3), thus fulfilling one of Tissaphernes’ major goals
(8.5.5) and a clause of the treaty.^’ But the Peloponnesians are
unhappy with the amount of rpocf>r] Tissaphernes agrees to pay, and
this leads to a second treaty,^^ which specifies that ‘the king shall pay
the expenses {tt]v Sandvrjv) for whatever army is in the territory
of the king, if the king has sent for it’ (8.37.4). In the midst of the
controversy about pay, no voice in the history has yet drawn
attention to the amazing clause in the first two treaties, negotiated
by commanders in the field, recognizing Persian claims to ‘all the
territory and cities that belong to the king or once belonged to his
ancestors’.’^ Only officials who come from Sparta to oversee the
conduct of the war raise objections. In a meeting with Tissaphernes
at Cnidos their leader, Lichas, complains that
it is terrible if the king claims to hold power even now over all the
territories that he and his ancestors ruled in the past: for that entails
that all the islands would be back in a state of slavery as well as Thessaly,
Locris, and as far as Boeotia, and that instead of giving the Greeks
freedom the Lacedaemonians would be imposing on them Median rule.
(8.43.3)

Refusing the
that comes on these terms, Lichas rejects both
of the previous treaties and demands a new one. Tissaphernes storms
out in a rage and negotiations break off. The Spartans sail for

See 8.18.3; cf. 8.28.3. On the whole Thucydides suggests that the capture of
Amorges was a coup for Tissaphernes and that even from the spoils of lasus the
Peloponnesians did not benefit as much as they could have; cf. Kallet (2001), 252,
following Lewis (1977), 91.
” 8.29.1, Thucydides implicitly links the dissatisfaction of some of the
Peloponnesian allies at this payment plan (8.29.2) with the revision of their treaty
with Persia (8.36.1-2).
” The two formulae at 8.18.1 and 8.37.2. For other differences in the two treaties’
formulation of what rights the king claims over these possessions, see Hornblower
(2008), 800-2 and 854-7.
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Rhodes, determined to renounce Persian help and collect other funds
(8.43.4-44.4).
After waiting so long to have the Spartans introduce the
ideological issue of Greek freedom (but after implicitly sounding
the alert since the time of the first treaty: see above on 8.17.4),
Thucydides’ narrative conveys the impossibility that the Spartans can
take a principled position and obtain a Persian alliance at the same
time. Lichas’ protest in fact conflates two overlapping points, one
concerning the extent of the country the Spartans give up to the king,
and the other about allowing him to enslave again {naXiv SovXeveiv)
any Greeks at all. When the Spartans and Tissaphernes patch up their
quarrel, they stipulate yet a different treaty, which limits the king’s
possession to territories in Asia. Lichas’ second complaint is thus
overruled by the same clause that addresses the first:
All the territory of the king in Asia is the king’s: and about his own
territory let the king decide as he wishes. (8.58.2)

These terms agree with the position of the Persians in Herodotus,
who repeatedly assert that Asia and its inhabitants belong to them.’^
Thucydides represents the Spartans as conflicted and in denial, but
also makes clear what their policy must be as the allies of Persia.
At one point the same Lichas who had reaffirmed the liberation
principle at Cnidos reminds the Milesians and others in the country
of the king that at least until the end of the war they are bound to
accept a ‘moderate degree of enslavement’ (xpyjvou ■ ■ ■ BovXeveiv ...
rd jueVpta, 8.84.5).

VIII. WHAT TISSAPHERNES WANTS
Tissaphernes’ indignant reaction to Lichas (dyavaKTwv, 8.43.4) is
the obverse of Xerxes’ rejoicing after reading Pausanias’ letter
(Sep^Tjs 8e rjad-q, 1.129.1). From this point in the narrative until
Tissaphernes’ fears (8e8uhs ■. • i4>o^€lro, 8.57.1) induce him to
backtrack and stipulate his third treaty with the Peloponnesians,
See 1.4.4: tt]v yap Aalrjv Kal ra ivoiKeovra edvea ^dp^apa oixrjiovvTat ot
Uepaai,, r-qv Si EvpwTTTjv xa'i to 'EXXrjViKov rjyyjvrai Keycoplodai (‘the Persians
consider Asia and the foreign people who inhabit it as their own, and they think that
Europe and the Greek world is separate’). Cf. 9.116.3.
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Thuq^dides devotes himself to an exploration of the motives of the
Persian satrap and of the choices by which he tries to achieve his
goal of re-establishing Persian dominion over the Ionian Greeks. We
learn at 8.45 that by the time he had walked out of the Spartan
meeting (8.43.4), he had already received the visit of Alcibiades, now
a fugitive from Sparta and intent on promoting his own interests.
Alcibiades becomes Tissaphernes’ ‘instructor in everything’, the
designer of his policy and apparently also his agent.®^ He advises
Tissaphernes not to be too much in a hurry to end the war by helping
the Peloponnesians, but rather to let the Greeks wear each other
out {avTOvs TTcpl iavTOvs rovs'EXXrjvas KaTarpiijjaL, 8.46.2). The
Athenians, he says, would make better ‘partners of empire’, since
unlike the Spartans they have no commitment to the freedom of the
Greeks. Tissaphernes should therefore wear out both sides {rpi^eiv
. .. dp,(f)OTepovs, 8.46.4) and after acquiring as much Athenian
territory as possible, expel the Peloponnesians (8.46.1—4).
Like Pausanias and Themistocles in Thucydides and numerous
characters in Herodotus, Alcibiades is the typical Greek at an Eastern
court making trouble for his fellow Greeks.’*’ It is interesting there
fore to find that in treating a Herodotean theme in this passage,
Thucydides also borrows again from the style of Ionian laroptr],
or at least one aspect of it: the reliance on opinion. His purposes
here are the historiographic purposes of separating Tissaphernes
from Alcibiades, deliberation from advocacy, and what is visible and
documented from what is not. The work of the historian appears
especially arduous in book 8, which is full of characters who lie.
Alcibiades is one of them, hovering over the figure of Tissaphernes,
who risks being confused with him. Thucydides reports Alcibiades’
advice and actions at great length, but in his attempt to determine
the ‘real’ motivations of a Persian grandee in an unfamiliar setting,
he appears to find himself with no reliable source and signals his
insecurity by resorting to the Herodotean method of explicit con
jecture (8.46.5): Tissaphernes, says Thucydides, ‘reasoned for the
most part in the same way as Alcibiades (StevoeiTo
ttXcov ovtcos)>
at least if one were to guess from what he did (oaa ye dv6 tcov
to

8.45.1; for the analepsis, see Hornblower (2008), 883-86; Rood (1998), 262-65.
His mixed role as adviser and executive is represented by the combination at 8.45.4-6
of verbs indicating what he said or did vis-i-vis others and verbs indicating what he
said to Tissaphernes.
’’’ See above, p. 254 and n. 59.
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TTOioviiivcov fjv etKoocu).*^ Tissaphernes heeds Alcibiades’ advice
first of all by paying the Peloponnesian sailors badly and irregularly.
He had followed this practice on his own in the past (8.29), but his
purpose this time—suggested by his didaskalos Alcibiades—is ‘to
ruin their mission, causing their ships to lose their fitness’. Also in
other respects, Thucydides adds, one could not possibly miss the lack
of energy he put into the common war (rd re dAAa Karacfsaveorepov p ware Xavddveiv ov TTpodvp,co?, 8.47.5). The end of this
sentence underlines again the historian’s endeavour to distinguish
between the seen (KaTac/saveaTepov) and the unseen (Xavddvetv), an
endeavour that pervades the Persian sections of book 8.
Thucydides indicates Tissaphernes’ independence from his Greek
adviser by mentioning nothing in this chapter about his reaction
to Alcibiades’ suggestion to find an accommodation with the
Athenians. Things change somewhat only after the quarrel with the
Peloponnesians at Cnidos (8.52; cf. 8.43), when Tissaphernes realizes
ipadero) the Spartans’ conflicted attitude with regard to the treaty.
Lichas’ complaint in fact verifies Alcibiades’ argument that the
Spartans were unlikely to set out to liberate the Greeks from Athens
only to enslave them to the Persians. It also perhaps implicitly
gives some credit to the other side of Alcibiades’ argument, namely
that the Athenians, accustomed as they are to holding the Greeks
under their rule, would be more willing ‘to share their enslavement
{^vyKaTaSovXovv), keeping the sea for themselves and leaving
to Tissaphernes the Greeks who inhabit the king’s country’.^*
After Cnidos, therefore, although Tissaphernes is afraid of the Pelo
ponnesians’ presence in Asia (SeStdra with the indicative, vaprjaav,
indicates that the fear is not unjustified), he starts considering
Alcibiades’ plan, but without great conviction: ‘he ... wanted to be
persuaded if he possibly could’ (jSouAdjU-evov Se ... et Svvairo ttoi?,
TTeLadfjvai). This is the closest Tissaphernes comes to agreeing
with the idea of an Athenian alliance. Alcibiades’ elaborate argu
mentations are designed to manipulate his internal audiences—
8.46.5. The verb eiVd^co in the sense of ‘guess’ or ‘infer’ (in contrast to oiSa,
‘know’: see 6.92.5 and 8.87.2-3) appears again to signal Thucydides’ uncertainty
about Persian intentions at 8.87.3. See below, p. 270. Of three other occurrences of
the verb in metanarrative, two are found in the Archaeology for guesses about the
distant past (1.9.4 and 1.10.2) and the third, at 6.60.2, in reference to the mystery
of the mutilations of the Herms. For eiKa^cD in the sense of compare at 4.36.3, see
above, p. 243.
Cf. 8.52, with a back reference to Alcibiades’ words at 8.46.3.
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Tissaphernes, the Athenians, and the Spartans (8.83.2, 87.1; cf.
80.1)—as well as his external ones—Thucydides’ readers and per
haps Thucydides himself. But Thucydides’ narrative makes clear
that from Tissaphernes’ perspective a deal between Persia and Athens
remains unlikely.”
Both Tissaphernes’ treaties with the Peloponnesians and
Alcibiades’ negotiations with the Athenians in Tissaphernes’ name
bargain away the freedom of the Greeks of Asia and cause internal
dissent. In Athens the mere prospect of Persian support has dis
proportionate consequences, persuading the demos to give up its
rights (8.53, 65-9). The Athenians continue to hope against all hope
(8.76) and Alcibiades encourages them by reporting the satrap’s
alleged assurances in exaggerated orientalizing terms (8.81.3, and see
above, p. 261).
Alcibiades’ discourse, however, has very little to do with what
Tissaphernes really wants.The supposed royal conditio sine qua
non for a Persian alliance, namely a change of government in Athens
(8.48.1), is not something Tissaphernes seems to know or care about.
When the oligarchs arrive at Sardis to confer on this deal, Alcibiades
invents extravagant demands designed to abort the negotiations
because he is himself uncertain about Tissaphernes’ position.
The latter ‘feared ((jso^ovfxevov) the Peloponnesians more than the
Athenians and, moreover, wanted to wear out both sides (rpi^eiv
dfM(f>oT€povs), as Alcibiades had instructed him to do’ (8.56.2), while
Alcibiades wanted to appear (So/cetv) to the Athenians able to
persuade Tissaphernes even if he was not able to do so (56.3). In the
midst of this obfuscation, Thucydides once again cannot be sure, but
offers his opinion: ‘It seems to me (So/cet 8e p.oi) that Tissaphernes
also wanted this result out of fear {8id to 84os, 8.56.3). He feared
(SeSidj?, €^o^€iTo) that without his support the Peloponnesians
would be defeated by the Athenians, or that they would defeat the
Athenians on their own, or that they would ravage his country in
search of sustenance’ (8.57.1).
Phrynicus had earlier described Tissaphernes’ predicament in
similar terms (8.48.2). Thucydides himself elsewhere theorizes
that fear is in general a compelling and perfectly rational motive for
” So also Hyland (2007), 8.
The verb /SoilAo/^ai occurs four times in 8.56.2-3 and another five times in
book 8 in reference to Tissaphernes’ hidden intentions.
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historical action (1.23.6; cf. 1.76.2). In Thucydides’ judgement there
fore, Tissaphernes’ decision to reconcile with the Peloponnesians and
stipulate a third treaty was made ‘with calculation and foresight of all
these factors, according to his intention to equalize the Greek forces
on each side’ (
ovv tovtojv XoyiafjiM Kat npovoia, (Lairep
i^ovXero iTvavioovv tovs 'EXXipvas Trpos dXXrjXovs, 8.57.1).
Xoyiap,6s denotes the careful reasoning that allows for prudent
action, advocated by leaders such as Archidamus and Hermocrates
(2.11.7 and 6.34.4, 6); npovoia, ‘foresight’, is the primary virtue of a
skilful statesman, which Thucydides attributes to Themistocles and
Pericles.Thucydides’ evaluation of Tissaphernes’ policy—based on
his opinion of the most rational motives for the satrap’s uneven
behaviour—is somewhat circular, but it represents a remarkable
exercise in fairness.*®^
ttcivtcov

IX. THE PHANTOM FLEET
An index of the historian’s difficulties in negotiating Persian
appearances and reality is the Phoenician fleet, of whose existence we
learn for the first time from the advice of Alcibiades to Tissaphernes
to diminish the Peloponnesians’ pay and not to bring out the
Phoenician fleet he was preparing’ (8.46.1). Tissaphernes follows
both suggestions, all the time promising to the Peloponnesians ‘that
the Phoenician fleet will arrive’ (8.46.5). The third mention of this
fleet occurs again in reported ‘speech’, this time an official written
document. A clause of the Peloponnesians’ third treaty with Persia
stipulates that Tissaphernes will maintain the Peloponnesian fleet
‘until the ships of the king arrive’; after that the Peloponnesians are
to provide for their own support and the two fleets will carry on the
See 1.138.3 (npoewpa) of Themistocles and 2.65.6 and 5 of Pericles {Trpovoia,
Trpoyvovs)Westlake (1985), 54 seems surprised that Thucydides, influenced by Alcibiades,
‘mistook the oriental wiliness of Tissaphernes of which he can have had little experi
ence, for the statesmanlike qualities which he so much admired’ (emphasis mine). It
is true that Thucydides cannot have had direct experience with Tissaphernes,
but he makes an honest attempt to evaluate him according to the same standards
he applies to Greek politicians, being especially careful to distance himself from the
representations of Alcibiades. For the principle that one’s opponents will deliberate
on the basis of calculations not radically different from one’s own, see the words of
Archidamus at 1.84.3-4.
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war jointly (8.58.5-7).The clause shows that the Phoenician ships
we have only heard about so far, through Alcibiades (8.46.2) and
Tissaphernes (8.47.5), are part of the Persian forces under direct
command of the king, although they are evidently available to
Tissaphernes for his operations in western Asia. Their role as
specified in the clause is ambiguous, because they will apparently not
(or not only) serve to support the Peloponnesians, but might even
replace them, taking over the war. The consequences are potentially
disquieting, but remain theoretical because in Thucydides’ narrative
as we have it the Persian ships will never become part of the action.
For the moment they are a pretence:
Tissaphernes prepared to bring the Phoenician ships, as it had been
agreed, and to fulfil all the other things which he had promised and
which at least (yow) he wanted to appear to be preparing. (8.59.1)

The metanarrative intervention yovv underlines Thucydides’
reformulation of the distinction between appearance and reality:
here the historical agent ‘wanted to appear’ (e/SouAero . .. 8rjXos
efmt), while at 8.47.5 his behaviour was ‘too apparent’ to hide his
true intentions (/cara^aveoTepov wore XavOdveiv).
According to the usual pattern of book 8, the mirage of Persian
support not only aggravates the conflict between Peloponnesians
and Athenians, but also causes stasis within each camp. The Pelo
ponnesian crews are in full protest mode against both Tissaphernes
and their own admiral, Astyochus, on the ground that both are ‘ruin
ing their mission’ by not permitting them to engage the Athenians,
leaving them without pay, and making them wait for the Phoenician
fleet, ‘which in any case was a fleet in name and not in fact’ {dXXcos
ovofxa Kal ovk epyov, 8.78).*“ The language of this piece, focalized
through the Peloponnesian crews, is close to that of Thucydides’
account of Tissaphernes’ policy (see 8.46.5), except that the Pelo
ponnesians also falsely suspect that Tissaphernes is favouring the
Athenians (8.83.2). Alcibiades, as a matter of fact, is assuring the
Athenians that Tissaphernes will bring the Phoenician ships, which
For this treaty, see above, p. 264.
In the Pentecontaetia the Phoenician fleet plays a decisive role against the
Athenians in Egypt (1.110.4), but fails to materialize at the time of the revolt of
Samos (1.116.3).
The sailors suspect Astyochus of taking bribes from Tissaphernes (8.83.3; cf.
8.45). For internal stasis among the Peloponnesians, see 8.78, 80, 83-5.
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are already at Aspendus, to them, rather than to the Peloponnesians
(8.81.3)—or at least, if not to them, not to the Peloponnesians either
(8.88.1). Once again, the reader first learns a crucial fact about these
ships—that they are deployed in Aspendus—from a reported speech.
The next passage is unique in Thucydides for the way in which the
narrative nucleus (essentially: ‘Tissaphernes went to Aspendus with
Lichas, leaving his lieutenant behind, but he did not bring back the
ships that were there’) is embedded in metanarrative that reveals
speculations, hearsay, and opinion:*^
In the same summer, Tissaphernes at precisely the time when the Pelo
ponnesians were most angry at him for many reasons, but especially on
account of the return of Alcibiades, thinking that evidently {(f>avepd>s)
he was now on the side of the Athenians, since he wished, as indeed it
seemed (^ouAd/xcvo?, d>s iSoKei 8ij), to clear himself of these charges,
prepared to travel to the Phoenician ships at Aspendus and invited
Lichas to go with him (8.87.1). He said that he would leave his lieu
tenant Tamos with the army to give them their pay while he was gone.
Accounts differ and it is not easy to know {Xeyerai Se ov Kara ravro
ovSe paSiov eihevai) with what intention (rtVi yvcjpLTj) he went to
Aspendus and, after going, he did not bring back the ships (8.87.2). For
it is certain (aa4>es eart) that the Phoenician ships, one hundred and
forty-seven in number, arrived as far as Aspendus, but why they did not
come is the object of many inferences (TroXXaxfj eiKa^eTai). Some say
that he went in order to wear down (SiaTpi/Siy) the Peloponnesian
mission just as he had planned {(Larrep Kal ?nevorjd-q)—in fact Tamos,
who had been put in charge, was not, to be sure (yovv), a better pay
master, but rather a worse one; others [say] that he had brought in the
Phoenicians in order to exact money from them for their discharge,
since he did not intend {ovSev e/aeAAe) to use them anyway; others
again [say] that he went on account of the accusation against him at
Sparta, so that it would be said that he was not doing anything wrong'“^
and that he had certainly gone (aa<f>a)s oiyerai) and the ships were
reaUy (dX-qOws) ready (8.87.3). It seems to me most certain, however
(e/xoi pLevTOi So/cef aa(j>iaTarov etvai), that he did not bring back the
ships with the aim of wearing down and delaying (rpijS-i)? eVe/ca Kal
dvoKwxvs) the Greeks, on the one hand by wasting [their resources]
{(f>dopds p.ev) while he remained lingering over there, and on the other
hand by equalizing [their forces[ (dviad)oea>s 8e0 in order not to make
For a narratological and historical analysis of this passage, see Lateiner (1976).
dis ovK dSiK€i (87.3) answering the Peloponnesian complaints that ‘they were
being wronged in every way’ (ndvra re dSiKoivTO 99.1).
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either side strongest by his support. For, if he had wanted to, he could
have finished the war with no ambiguous results really coming out in
the open in an unambiguous way {eTu^avels Stjttov ovk evSoiaarws).
For tf he had brought his fleet out he would in all likelihood [Kara to
eiKos) have given the victory to the Spartans, who even at the present
moment were facing the Athenians with a fleet that was more equal
than inferior (8.87.4). What convicts him most of all is the ostensible
reason (7Tp6<f>aaiv) he gave for not bringing the ships: he said that they
were fewer in number than the king had ordered him to collect. But in
this case he would rather have received more gratitude, if he had not
spent many of the king’s resources while achieving the same results
(8.87.5). But whatever his intention {fjTiviSrj yvcofMrj), Tissaphernes
arrived at Aspendus and joined up with the Phoenicians. (8.87.6)

This fleet that never enters the scene of the action, and in this
sense never becomes a tangible reality—a fleet that is only a name
{ovofxa Kal ovk epyov, 8.78) from the point of view of the
beleaguered Greeks—embodies the imperfectly known resources of
Persia as well as the power and strategy of the distant king,
whose orders are again represented (or misrepresented) indirectly
through Tissaphernes’ speech (8.87.5). Thucydides himself is at a
loss, and enumerates only the few positive facts he can count on as
certain {aacfs-). There were certainly (8.87.3: aa(f)es, dXrjdcos) 147
Phoenician ships at Aspendus—the precise number suggests the
reliability of the information. It is also certain that Tissaphernes went
to Aspendus (8.87.1; 2; 3, aacfxios otyerai; 6), but (and this is a
negative fact, contradicting expectations) he failed to bring back the
ships. What is less easy to know for sure (8.87.2 ov8e paSi.ov eldevai)
is Tissaphernes’ motive for going to Aspendus, and his overall plan
with regard to the Greek war (8.87.1, /3ouAdp,evo?; 87.2, tIvi yvwpirj-,
8.87.3, Sievo-i^Or], efxeXXe; 87.6, TjTivtSi) yvcofxr]). Tissaphernes’
behaviour creates, or means to create, certain appearances (87.1,
(jsavepoos tjBt] arToci^ovTi; 87.2; 87.3, yovv), and is explained by him
with a pretext (87.5, TTpocfsaoiv). His real intentions are at any rate
a matter for various speculations (87.3, TroXXaxfj etA:d^eTat),‘“®
opinions (87.1, cu? e’Sd/cet St)), and reports (87.2, Xeyerai 8i ov
Kara ravTo; 87.3, ol puev ... ol 8e ... aXXoi S’). All of them are
plausible, but the greatest possible certainty resides in the opinion of
The verb eiK-a^erai is the same Thucydides had used to infer Tissaphernes’
motivations from his actions at 8.46.5: oaa ye dwo twv TTOwvp,4vu>v pv eiKdoai. See
above, pp. 265-6 and n. 97.
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the histor Thucydides (87.4, e/tiot ^livroi SoKei aa<f>4ararov e?vai)
to the effect that Tissaphernes wanted to wear down both sides in
the Greek War, and not simply ruin the Peloponnesian cause,
according to Alcibiades’ original advice and in agreement with
Thucydides’ assessment of Tissaphernes’ policy earlier on.““
This passage represents Thucydides’ most dramatic divergence
from the method he had announced in what Hornblower calls
the ‘haughty’ chapter 1.22.‘" It is Herodotean, although in a very
different way than the Pausanias—Themistocles performance of oral
tradition and exotic detail."^ It is a cautious piece of analytical
reasoning that combines features of Thucydides’ style“’ with the
method, more typical of Herodotus, of presenting several inter
pretations of an event, including one preferred by the narrator."'*
Thucydides here embraces Herodotus’ narratorial stance and
makes it his own without irony or mock-competition—in fact with
apparent resignation to his coming across as somewhat pedestrian
and redundant in a way his predecessor never does.
Thucydides’ efforts to be an objective observer become par
ticularly strenuous throughout book 8, where special interests and
fragmented actions multiply. The praise of the extreme oligarch
Antiphon (8.68), the indictment of the exaggerations of the
democrat Chaereas (8.74), the exposure of Alcibiades’ lies, coupled
with the recognition of his service (8.86.4), the positive judgement
on the government of the 5,000 (8.97.2), all these interventions are
part of the same balancing act and effort not to be seduced by one

As Lateiner observes (1976), 271, this observation now differentiates
Thucydides’ opinion from the first report, at 8.87.3. So also Hyland (2007), 11.
See 8.56.2 (^ouAo/nevou . .. TpijSeiv d/xi^oTepous), where Tissaphernes is
heeding the advice Alcibiades expressed at 8.46.2 (auroi)? trepi eavToiis rods
"EWirjvas Kararpitpat) and 8.46.4 (rpijSea' . . . ap,<j>oripovs). Alcibiades, according
to Thucydides, is among the characters of the history the best informed about what
Tissaphernes plans to do, at least in the short range, ‘knowing in all likelihood
Tissaphernes’ intentions, that he was not going to bring the ships’ (eiScos, (hs ci/rdj,
eK TiXeovos rrjv Tiaaa(f>epvovs yv<hp.-qv, on ovk
e/xcAAe, 8.88.1).
*" Hornblower (2008), 1005.
On Pausanias-Themistocles, see above, §IV.
So the antithesis with variatio in the sequence rpL^yjs ev€Ka Kat avoKco')(rjs ...
<f>dopds p,iv ... dviawoeco'; 5e at 8.87.4 is typically Thucydidean; cf. for example
1.84.4.
Cf Herodotus 6.75.3 and 6.84 (speculation about causes) and 1.86.2 (specula
tion about motives). For other variant versions in Herodotus, cf Lateiner (1976),
267-9.
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view or the other, as is also the narrator’s evaluation of Tissaphernes’
rationality in pursuit of his interests (8.57.1; see above, p. 268).
Thucydides can report and judge homegrown phenomena with his
accustomed authority, just as he can deliver a stunning reconstruc
tion of the stasis in Athens or vividly describe the atmosphere of the
Athenian fleet at Samos. He is able to give his Greek characters
extended speeches, albeit in indirect discourse. But in the case of an
unknown power whose actions are visible only on the margins
and whose policies are filtered through individuals with personal
agendas, the result is a blurry portrayal. Thucydides’ objective stance
requires a display of subjectivity (‘some say . .. others say . .. but
from what one can infer . ..’) amounting to an admission that he
does not really know.
This partial return to Herodotus’ historiographic method also
happens to coincide with flashing evocations of specific Herodotean
passages and scenes. At 8.87.3, the hypothetical gloss ‘if he had
wanted to ... he could have finished the war with no ambiguous
results ... if he had brought his fleet out he would in all likelihood
have given the victory to the Spartans’ corresponds to Herodotus’
more passionate extended opinion {yvaj^-q, Hdt. 7.139.1) con
cerning the Athenians’ decisive choice to fight at Salamis: ‘If the
Athenians had not resisted Xerxes on the sea . .. Hellas would have
been conquered’ (7.139.2-4)."^
It does not bode well for the future that now it is not a Greek city
that can determine the success of a war against the Persian king, but
a Persian satrap who has the power to decide the outcome of a war
between Greeks. When Thucydides records the headquartering of the
Athenians at Sestos, ‘the town in the Ghersonese held by the Medes
at an earlier period in this history as the centre for the defence of
the Hellespont’ (Thuc. 8.62.3), he brings us back to his own and
to Herodotus’ account of the end of the Persian War (Thuc. 1.89.1;
Hdt. 9.115-16). The four Athenian ships overtaken by the Pelo
ponnesians off Elaeus, one of which is captured opposite the
temple of Protesilaus (8.102.4), reshuffle the terms of Herodotus’
Hellespontine chapters, where Protesilaus and his temple establish a

There are other hypothetical glosses of interpretation in Thucydides; see
e.g. 8.96.4. But 8.87.3 is exceptional for its length and because it is combined with the
other metanarrative features we have seen.
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connection with the remote past."*^ At the end of Thucydides’ work,
the Greeks living in Asia appear again unprotected from the abuses
of all sides. Already the Chians have suffered in an unprecedented
way ‘since the Persian Wars’, this time at the hands of the
Athenians.”^ Tissaphernes’ lieutenant Arsaces oppresses the
Antandrians, who chase his garrison from the city (8.108.4). This
man, says Thucydides with an analeptic move in the Herodotean
manner, had treacherously massacred the Delians who had settled at
Atramyttion after the Athenians had expelled them from Delos.“*
The episode recalls and inverts the harsh treatment of the Persian
Artayktes with which Herodotus ends his narrative of the Persian
War (9.121-2).“*

X. CONCLUSION
Thucydides’ treatment of the Persians is uneven and difficult to
summarize in a schematic or global way. We can safely say that he
never shows particular interest in, or familiarity with, their culture
or the political organization and history of the Persian Empire per se;
by the same token, he does not play up Persian stereotypes, either,
and (‘Pausanias-Themistocles’ aside) he avoids emphasizing the
alterity of the East. He makes us aware of the formative importance
of the Persian Wars for the ideology of the Greeks as they embark on
their internal conflict, although for most of his history he tends to
dismiss Persia as a secondary concern. Separately from the rhetorical
exploitation of the Persian War by his historical agents, Thucydides
does not fully convey his own appreciation for the moral dimension
of that event until his narrative of the Sicilian Expedition. After that,
the reappearance on the Greek horizon of the Persian threat (or
lifeline, depending on one’s viewpoint) brings back images of the
contest between Greece and Persia, and particularly of the dis
couraging struggle for the ‘liberation’ of the Asiatic Greeks. Here
Hdt. 9.116. For Protesilaus in Herodotus, see Boedeker (1988). That Thucy
dides’ mention of the temple of Protesilaus at 8.102.4 represents an allusion to
Herodotus is accepted by Hornblower (2008), 1047 following Pelling (2000), 269.
8.24.3, with reference to Hdt. 6.26-7; cf. above, p. 262 and note 90.
Thucydides records the expulsion of the Delians at 5.1 See above, pp. 258-9.
Hornblower (2008), 1052.
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Thucydides is also faced with the task of representing a close-up of
contemporary Persians, because Persia is now a protagonist, not
merely an object of memory or a sideline player. Does the end
of his history amount to an acknowledgement of inadequacy on
Thucydides’ part?
I have deliberately avoided the various issues concerning the
unfinished state of book 8, but I am reminded that many years ago
Donald Lateiner (it happens co-editor of this volume, but at the
time my teacher at the University of Pennsylvania) gave me a
fictional piece he had written (‘a nuga from 1974, in my romantic
phase’, according to the dedication),which represents a tired but
still dogged Thucydides in 405, as an exile in Thrace, mulling over
the course of the war that he knows Athens can no longer win,
and even more depressed about his ‘unfinished and unfinishable
work’, which has fallen so far behind current events. The new role
of Persia as arbiter of the Greeks must have been hard for such a man
to integrate into his already complex picture. Better to leave the
challenge to someone younger and more fit for eastern travels, even
if it must be the one whom Lateiner’s Thucydides calls ‘that idiot
Xenophon’.
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